The switch to digital terrestrial television is now a global trend. In Latin America, where the terrestrial platform has a dominant role, the introduction of DTT raises important questions for economic and industrial development, as well as pluralism. This article focuses on the earliest experiences (Brazil, México and Argentina) and those of the newcomers (Chile, Colombia and Uruguay). The aim is to outline the differences between the various political decision processes and the way with which they have been turned into communication policies, so as to draw some conclusions that contribute to visualizing the future of television in the region. 
Introduction
Television in Latin America has predominantly followed the United States (US) commercial licensing model, financed by advertising and based on the granting of few highpower licences to commercial operators in return for loosely (or politically) defined obligations. Therefore, public and not-for-profit broadcasters have always had a secondary role and the market has been controlled in each country by few companies, some of which nowadays are moreover part of multimedia groups and/or have connections with foreign capital.
1 Both local politics and the globalization of media markets have been shaping the development of Latin American media since the nineties (Fox and Waisbord, 2002 ).
In such a scenario, where the television industry has historically suffered from technological dependence, financial turbulence and a lack of (or limited) competition, the switch to digital television may prove to be either a unique opportunity to achieve important reforms or another chance to favour adaptation to existing industry arrangements over change.
Since terrestrial television is one of the most important means of delivery of entertainment, penetration of satellite and cable is mostly relatively low and concentration and foreign ownership are not the exception to the rule (Mastrini and Becerra, 2001; , the digital future of one of the few media services universally available is crucial.
Most countries, generally speaking, are still laying the foundations for the complete switch to digital television. But the dominant role of the terrestrial platform and the economic and technical constrains the cable and satellite options present, in addition to the peculiar combination of political contexts, policy traditions and regulatory frameworks, are driving digital terrestrial television (DTT) towards the centre of switchover strategies. The numerous opportunities for economic and industrial development, as well as pluralism, that the amount of spectrum to be released and the necessity to upgrade equipment raise, have led most Latin American countries to adopt an explicit policy on the transition to digital television.
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These incentives explain the launch of trials and pilots in most countries of the region.
Nevertheless these are still in embryonic condition in most countries, (CITEL, 2005 (CITEL, , 2007 CNTV, 2006) with the exceptions of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, which represent the oldest experiences and have led the way for late starters, such as Chile, Colombia and
Uruguay. This article focuses on the former as the most relevant case studies, among other reasons because of the size of their internal markets (the largest in the region) and their regional political influence. In addition, Mexico and Brazil lead the regional production of TV sets.
So, from pioneering decisions such as the Argentinean selection of ATSC, a decision later dropped but finally instead adopted by Mexico, to the Brazilians' plans to encourage an independent development of a new standard, the objectives pursued in this article are mainly two: firstly, and from a general point of view, to outline the differences that exist within these political decision processes and the way that they have been turned into communication policies; secondly, to draw some conclusions that contribute to visualizing the future of the media with the highest penetration and impact in the region.
So as to achieve these objectives, case studies are described and analyzed taking a historical approach, organized in three periods, that allows to establish similarities and differences, conclude about potential lessons -also in the light of the experience of more developed countries -and offer a summary of opportunities and challenges that contribute to the design of policies that favour the democratization of the sector.
In the light of previous digital broadcasting and switchover policy research, that has tended to analyse national case studies (Frezza and Sorice, 2004; Brown and Picard, 2005; Cave and Nakamura, 2007; Starks, 2007; Fernández Alonso et al, 2008 ) and stress differences between countries (Galperin, 2004; García Leiva et al, 2006; García Leiva, 2008) and even international models (Bustamante, 2008) and regional blocks (García Leiva and Starks, 2009) , it is argued here that an analysis of the younger Latin American experiences can contribute to a better understanding of the transition to digital television across the world.
The aim of this piece is therefore to build upon the existing body of works about the region to offer a complementary broader and critical comparative picture (Hernández & Postolski, 2003; Galperin, 2003 Galperin, , 2007 Siqueira Bolaño & Cruz Brittos, 2003 Siqueira Bolaño & Rodrigues, 2004; Gómez, 2007; Kaplún, 2008; Cepeda, 2008) .
The nineties: an embryonic period
The countries here considered took their first steps towards DTT during the nineties.
In Argentina the initiative to experiment with digital terrestrial transmissions came from the private sector (ATA), upon whose request in Menem decided, unilaterally and in absolute alignment with the US approach, to adopt ATSC in 1998, after freely allocating a second channel to the incumbent national operators for three years with which to experiment.
Rhetoric aside, two were the main reasons for this decision: the pressure placed by existing licensees to preserve their position and expand towards a new service, and the governmental interest in having an advantage in the digital television market over Brazil (Albornoz, Hernández and Postolski, 2000) . Although the de la Rúa government did question the decision, it had more pressing priorities and the switchover policy was left behind. The 2001 socioeconomic crisis gave place to a chaotic situation and the successive provisional administrations did not make any decision about the matter. In Brazil the initial pioneering interest in DTT came from the government, which in June 1991 created a commission to design a high definition television policy (COM-TV).
Four years later, the main broadcast industry groups, SET and ABERT, created a joint technical committee to study the implementation of digital TV and evaluate the competing standards, objectives that would then be taken up by the newly created regulator ANATEL from 1998 on, substituting COM-TV. Undoubtedly, such rapid official support for the broadcasters' interest can only be understood because of the country's manufacturing industry potential. But another element that made the Brazilian experience different was the fact that, due to increasing participation of civil society, the whole process that was about to begin would be characterized by at least some degree of transparency and accountability unusual for the region (Siqueira Bolaño and Cruz Brittos, 2003) .
The path of DTT in Chile has been tortuous. The advent of Ricardo Lagos to the Presidency in 2000 put on hold the existing plans that by the end of the nineties had already designed a legal and technical architecture to introduce the service through the Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) and Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones (Subtel).
According to Hernández and Postolski (2003) the main reason for this was the lack of consensus between these agencies and the broadcasters (ANATEL), who were pro-ATSC.
Moreover, even though Bachelet's government finally boosted the process, some point out that the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement signed in 2003 might have potential implications that should be taken into consideration (Bernier, 2004) .
In any case, already in this preliminary phase some of the elements that would characterize DTT policies during the subsequent years in those countries with the most advanced experiences can be detected:
 Constant moving backwards and forwards in the introduction of the service.
Particularly as regards the question of standard selection, Chile and Peru are paradigmatic examples of official announcements followed by successive delays.
 Hasty decision-making, significant in the case of Argentina, the consequence of none or little planning.
 Dependency issues, in relation to media groups, as well as trade commitments.
 And a lack of debate, only partially overcome in Brazil through public consultations and an increasing participation of civil society in communication issues. In the same direction, but with different outcomes, public hearings have also set important milestones in Chile and Colombia.
The first lustrum of the new millennium: trials and drawbacks
Around the turn of the century a second phase began, mainly due to the emergence of a debate that questioned the real consequences of migrating terrestrial networks, a new sociopolitical context and some changes among the incumbent audiovisual operators. Whereas this resulted in Argentina in the abandonment, in practice, of ATSC, in Mexico the process that would adopt it was initiated, while Brazil supported the option of creating a completely new standard (of its own creation).
In Argentina, setting aside de la Rúa's victory, stakeholders' consensus around ATSC disappeared when Telefónica entered the television market and subsequently decided to 8 support DVB (Hernández and Postolski, 2003 Nevertheless, its actions and recommendations were one-sided due to the lack of representatives of civil society in its composition.
In Brazil, to the surprise of many, the 1999/2000 tests came out in favour of the Japanese system, opening a broad debate that took place in many public consultations conducted by ANATEL. The complexity of the interests at stake placed them outside ANATEL's mandate, which is why the Cardoso government decided to wait until making any decision. In fact, the President ignored the ideas of the professional sector (Federacão Nacional dos Jornalistas) and dismissed the Chinese offer to jointly build a fourth alternative international standard.
The outcome of the 2002 general elections, won by Lula, marked a major shift in the Brazilian digital strategy. Not only was the possibility of cooperating with China or India put back on the table, but the idea of creating a national standard from scratch was also supported.
In short, a more strategic approach to transition was taken and digital television became a key tool for achieving other two goals: revitalizing the Brazilian consumer electronics industry and addressing the significant inequalities in access to advanced information and communication services among the population (Galperin, 2007) . 
The pioneers
The Mexican decision, contained within a detailed policy document issued by the SCT, 3 has not been a surprise and must be understood in the context of the NAFTA: the complete transition to digital television can constitute a unique opportunity for the domestic consumer electronic industry. At the same time, ATSC's efforts were officially supported in a systematic way because it has always been crucial for the US and its global audiovisual industry to achieve a North American market (Canada had already adopted the standard in November 1997).
As Michael McEwen, Secretary General of the North America Broadcasters
Association, put it: 'We are set for an historic leap in North America, with a market of well over 400 million consumers, consumer DTV equipment will have the advantage of the economies of scale of a huge mass market. Likewise broadcasters and manufacturers will benefit from similar economies'. This has led to a fierce battle between television and telecommunication operators. The final system was designed to be adapted to existing infrastructure, is based on MPEG-4, supports a Brazilian open middleware named Ginga and is of course capable of transmitting low bit rate video programmes to mobile handheld devices. This was a very important detail that made broadcasters push for the decision through Helio Costa, since it will allow them to deliver content without relying on telecommunication companies (Intervozes, 2006) .
The decree also states that incumbent operators are to receive free-of-charge one additional frequency to simulcast their analogue channels and that the transition will take ten years to be completed throughout the whole country before the final switch-off of analogue TV. Japan's promises were in the end decisive as well for a country whose local manufacturing capacity is critical: exemption from royalty payments, the possibility of Last but not least, there is a chance that the introduction of DTT might boost public service broadcasting due to the fact that the creation of local public service channels was announced together with the launch of a common platform for federal public service stations with the aim of reducing costs and accelerating the deployment of the service.
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Upcoming full launches
It could be said that Uruguay and Colombia find themselves somewhere in between the first and second set of launching experiences described above. Despite the initial adoption 13 of DVB, a number of very important decisions must still be made, while crucial challenges lie ahead (coverage implementation, effective adoption…).
In Uruguay DTT was not really part of the public agenda until the arrival of Tabaré 
Successive delays and erratic processes
Two groups can be identified within the rest of the countries that have begun more or less explicit processes to introduce DTT services. Firstly, the most recent Peruvian, Venezuelan and Bolivian experiences can be mentioned. In Bolivia as well as in Peru, the debate about the migration to digital television was not introduced until 2007 and trials took place in 2008. This is also the case of Venezuela whose peculiarity resides in the fact that ATSC was ruled out as an option for ideological reasons from the very beginning. Secondly, the contrasting older and more complex Argentinean and Chilean journeys will be outlined.
In Peru a special commission to decide on the technical standard to be adopted was set would have had chosen a standard. But after three years, many public hearings, lots of technical tests and some special official reports, Chile had yet to make a decision. Delays raised intense debates, which took place in parallel to the regulatory reform of the audiovisual sector (changes in rules affecting radio, television and public service broadcasting were approved). In November 2008, Bachelet's government even presented a draft law to regulate the introduction of DTT services. But although this recognized the development of regional, local and community television, it was accused of being too generous towards incumbent operators.
Finally, falling in line with Brazil, Peru and Argentina, Chile officially adopted ISDB-T, citing better reception capabilities, given the characteristics of the country, as well as economic reasons (royalty exemptions and a converter around 40 pesos were decisive).
14 Before the 2010 earthquake, it was announced that the migration would cover a period of eight years, giving the population plenty of time to adapt.
Finally, in the case of Venezuela, where a memorandum of understanding was signed with Japan in October 2009, it is expected that within 2010 a ten-year transition strategy will be outlined. The aim would be the promotion of e-government, e-education and e-health services through DTT.
Ten years with DTT: similarities and differences
What are then the lessons that might be deduced from the experiences described above? Before answering that question it is important to understand the main similarities and differences among them. In doing so, it can be said that Argentina and Brazil represent the most different early strategies that could have been adopted in the region. In the case of the former, the initial hurry that led to an authoritarian and conservative policy ended up in an uncertain situation without a transition plan or a solid standard decision until 2009. Brazil tried a totally independent R&D path full of public consultations, although finally opting for the Japanese standard, modified with a Brazilian flavour, because of technical, financial as well as political reasons.
Although the country generated the most complex decision-making process in the region, it seems that in the end its DTT policy was influenced by those liberalizing measures introduced in the nineties. That is why, even though it can be said that there is room for hope, the fact is that the introduction of the service has not lowered the entrance barriers to the television market (Siqueria Bolaño and Cruz Brittos, 2007).
It remains an open question whether other Latin American countries will follow the Brazilian decision along with Peru, Argentina and Chile, while without this giant the once contemplated possibility of building a new regionally-shared standard was almost lost from the beginning. Mercosur's mechanisms to reach consensus were not enough when faced with national interests. 15 The remaining countries will surely have to limit their decisions to choosing between the Japanese/Brazilian, North American or European standard, as most of them are either too small or too poor to lead alternative strategies.
In relation to this, trade agreements (like the ones many signed with the US), foreign presence in media ownership and the structure of the existing broadcasting and consumer electronics industries will be key elements to take into consideration when analyzing the determining factors. These, together with the political orientation of those in power and the lobby of governments and organizations with a stake in each of the competing systems, go a long way towards explaining the different standards choices across the countries examined in this article.
Mexico is a prime example due to the fact that its decision over ATSC implies a close Nonetheless, what has been clear up to now is that the main trade-offs involved in the national decisions were basically focused on which standard to support and when to intervene.
Argentina was the only country to pick a standard at a very early stage, since most waited to learn how interstandard rivalry developed. During this approximately five-year process Mexico chose ATSC and Brazil decided to support a standard-setting process that encouraged intersystem and interstandard competition. When the administration of President Lula finally made up its mind, the rest were forced to choose as well. In other words, once Mexico and Brazil were established as dominant players, the bandwagon gathered momentum. So, even though official interest in DTT was born a decade ago, it is still difficult to point out similarities and differences. Nonetheless, the strategies to introduce the service share -from a general point of view and beyond national specificities -the following elements:
 The introduction of DTT services is being made in direct relation with the complete migration to digital broadcasting. As a consequence, no country has launched digital terrestrial television without considering universal access issues and adopting an analogue switch-off timetable.
 In a context where pay-TV services have a low penetration, free-to-air options prevail.
 The decisions made by the pioneering countries were motivated by the condition of major markets in terms of size and influence (Mexico, Argentina and Brazil; TV receiver manufacturing is an important industry in both Mexico and Brazil).
 Therefore, technological and industrial development and economic advantages, rather than the promotion of social inclusion and cultural diversity, were the motives for the introduction of digital terrestrial television.
 That is why Siqueira Bolaño and Cruz Brittos' conclusion about the Brazilian example (2007) might be applicable to the rest of the most advanced experiences: DTT models under construction do not present real and in-depth changes in important matters, such as pluralism or social participation, that could lead to social inclusion. The digitization of universal and 'free' terrestrial television has until now only accelerated existing inequalities.
 This explains the fact that public service broadcasting, already marginal and weak in most countries, is not being considered for taking on a leading role.
 Finally, it is interesting to point out the existence of public debates through consultations and hearings and the formation of commissions/study groups, despite their heterogeneous means and scopes. The path initiated by Chile and Colombia is encouraging. In Brazil, civil society has been organized to defend the democratization of communications, while the government even made a self-development attempt supporting research around a Brazilian standard. By contrast, the Mexican and Argentinean committees were mere masquerades.
The fact that all decisions about the introduction of DTT are being taken in parallel to crucial regulatory debates about the future of communications (laws and rules being under revision) is also a relevant element to point out.
Lessons from divergent approaches
Therefore, as regards the lessons which the introduction of DTT in Latin America has provided, the following stand out. To begin with, it must be said that the predominantly supported DTT models clearly draw from free-to-air options and traditions and at the same 22 time tend to preserve existing audiovisual arrangements. It is evident that analogue architectures are determining factors that influence policy options.
Nevertheless, the outcome is far from clear since, generally speaking, the main alternatives seem to be:
 Support for high definition alternatives, though partially and with expensive migration costs for the complete value chain (Mexico).
 Trust in the introduction of interactive value-added services as drivers for consumption and free-pay business models (Brazilian plans).
 Or emphasis on the increase of the number of channels, multiplying the standard definition offering (Uruguay, Colombia), with the risk of putting too much future pressure on business models basically dependent on advertising (small or even turbulent markets).
Secondly, it emerges as evident that where consensus is not stable and the introduction of DTT services is decided unilaterally -by political motives or through purely market-driven approaches -and without every stakeholder's involvement, tendency to disruption is higher, leading to delays and periods of uncertainty. Similarly, official decisions and announcements with little or no connection with market conditions and consumer needs tend to fail. This is the case with analogue switch-off dates set politically, aggressive migration plans or even naive policies.
Thirdly, due to supranational logics embodied in regional policies and trade agreements, different public policy traditions and styles or financial limitations, public intervention is only shyly or non-explicitly displayed (in which case the reason is usually partisan interference). The problem is that this state of affairs makes it more difficult to break the typical vicious cycle that has negatively influenced the introduction of the service in other parts of the world.
From the relatively successful experiences of those countries that started upon the digital switchover journey earlier (United Kingdom, France, Italy), it has been learned that consumers need to be offered a good quality free-to-view option with receivers available at affordable prices in the open market as key elements to gain rapid take-up and pursue equalitarian access.
Additionally, the need for cooperation is significant. The region suffers from a historical lack of a coordinated approach to the audiovisual sector. Therefore, there has not been up to now a common position towards the digitization of terrestrial networks. Any original intention of full-scale harmonization efforts for the region vanished as each country started adopting its own policies. In other words, while Latin America has its own regional trade agreements (Mercosur, Andean Community, CARICOM), decision-making processes have to date remained with the individual nations.
Finally, international pressure from governments and agencies with a stake in the three main digital TV standards has also played a role. However, fierce lobbying has increasingly and interestingly had to face 'flirting' processes during the last few years. Many South American countries have realized that even though they might not be able to support an independent development of a separate standard they can negotiate at least some benefits (free technical support, exemptions from royalty payments, financial aid, etc.)
Lessons from the developed world?
Following Starks (2007) , who contemplates digital switchover strategies in countries that launched DTT around the turn of the century, the question raised in this article is whether learning points that help reduce risks and foster success can be identified for Latin America.
Useful lessons gathered from the experience of more developed nations would include the following (Spectrum and Value Partners, 2007; García Leiva and Starks, 2009 ).
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Digital frequencies need to be allocated to incumbent operators to facilitate the transition to DTT (though not necessarily exclusively). Where additional capacity exists frequencies have been awarded mainly through 'beauty contests', with the exception of public service broadcasting, and spectrum has been reserved for local and regional channels. In most cases, licensing, usually for 10/15 years, makes distinctions between authorisations for transmission service providers (networks), multiplex operators and content providers (stations).
As has already been mentioned, a solid free-to-air option, accompanied by affordable receivers in the open market, is behind the highest penetrations. And in countries where pay-DTT services exist, the requirement of sharing common access technology is central to ensuring that receivers can support different competitive pay-TV channels.
More specifically, where terrestrial reception is dominant, the transition does not have to rely solely on digital terrestrial transmissions, since other platforms might contribute more cost-effectively to offering universal services. Whereas all countries have set a hard date for the switch-off of analogue signals, transition periods vary widely, as do approaches to switchover (national scale, region-by-region, by 'islands').
Subsidies can certainly play a role, especially in the closing stage of mandatory switchover and with helping vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or the unemployed. They can be introduced for the supply and/or the demand side. Nevertheless, in any case, switchover cannot be implemented without high public awareness. Consequently, campaigns must be in place well in advance.
Finally, smooth and close cooperation between the main stakeholders has proven essential. That is why many countries have suggested or facilitated the creation of consortiums/associations to support the introduction of the service (e.g. Digital UK, Impulsa TDT, DGTVi).
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In other words, 'no country has attempted to achieve an entirely "hands-off" digital switchover process. Government and regulators have accordingly been involved in a range of interventions: from cajoling, facilitating industry bodies, formalising standard-setting, licensing new spectrum allocations, planning the practicalities of switchover and protecting the interests of the consumer. Where there is a major national public service broadcaster, it has generally taken a central role, though this role varies' (García Leiva et al, 2006: 44) .
To conclude: opportunities and challenges
Due to the fact that it might be too soon to deduce conclusive tendencies and define the DTT models that will emerge in Latin America, an approach that takes into consideration the negative and positive characteristics which the case studies are providing could for the moment be more useful. That is why the aim is to point out the most evident challenges and opportunities through the six dimensions mentioned below, with the intention of clarifying the possibilities that DTT could enable.
 Discourse
Apart from the fact that, generally speaking, promises and ideal models for what DTT should bring about are currently facing a complicated translation into reality, priorities and goals established in official programmes and reports show the discursive dominance of economic-industrial logics and the side-stepping of social, cultural and educative concerns.
Danger lies, therefore, in the sole consideration of criteria such as spectrum efficiency or the pursuit of new business opportunities for the audiovisual sector, while objectives like diversity and quality of contents or pluralism are left behind.
 Regulators and regulation
In a region where during the last few years decisive though intence debates about the future and regulation of communications have been taking place, the creation or development 26 of independent and transparent regulatory agencies has still to materialize. At the same time, the difficulties with forming coherent and integral legal frameworks constitute an important threat as well. In both cases, at least two variables are currently significantly influencing the outcome: the juridical and geographical nature of regulation and regulators. In other words, national and public dimensions are nowadays insufficient to explain complex interactions and multiple relationships, because frontiers are blurred (national/local, global/regional blocs, public/private).
 Offering
If DTT is considered to be the perfect substitute for universal analogue terrestrial networks, the advantages it presents might as well be dilemmas. Depending on the model to be promoted, existing architectures with better quality pictures might be preserved or, to the contrary, challenged, resulting in potential repercussions for funding options, implicated stakeholders and reception alternatives. There are obviously no pre-designed customizable solutions but, beyond the selection of technical standards, the opportunity to forge a more consistent regional approach is still possible as regards audiovisual cooperation through exchange, coproduction and distribution.
 Stakeholders DTT could certainly help reconfigure the audiovisual sector democratizing existing ownership structures, hand in hand with civil society, public service broadcasting and local level authorities, as a non-negotiable starting point for the promotion of competition and pluralism. Such a development would certainly have to challenge the statu quo and the role played by new agents (gatekeepers such as EPG and CAS providers or multiplex operators), not necessarily belonging to the traditional audiovisual world (receiver industry, network operators) and sometimes historically 'foreign' to it (telecommunication operators).
 Geographical levels/markets
Regional blocks and international logics permanently influence the national level, which is why markets cannot be considered any more without taking this element into consideration. It is essential to understand that DTT in Latin America is affected on the one hand by its own audiovisual history and national policies and, on the other hand, by agreements reached within and between regional blocks (Mercosur, Andean Community, CARICOM, NAFTA; EU), as well as on the global level (WTO, ITU). The consideration of the region as one of the fields where the global battle over standards has been taking place is an overwhelming geopolitical example.
 Audiences
Finally, as regards the status audiences can acquire, it is important to point out the possibility that the client might gain priority over the citizen if DTT is understood as another possibility for audiovisual consumption instead of (or in addition to) a new opportunity for participation. Efforts should be directed not only at promoting the representation and presence of citizens in broadcasting activities, but also in the policy debates and decision-making processes. In this sense, some of the experiences described are, at least, encouraging.
To conclude, it must be said that the biggest challenge DTT posses in a region where terrestrial television is the most important means of delivery of information and entertainment has to do with building balanced public policies that are up to the expectations of the audiovisual sector, while also taking citizens' rights into consideration. In doing so, the challenges mentioned could be turned into a unique opportunity: strengthening universal and democratic access to audiovisual services in the digital era. 6 Japan agreed to support those companies willing to invest in the Brazilian semiconductor industry, which is why a joint working group has been established, but few advances have been registered. Toshiba might lead the way through the collaboration that is taking place with CEITIC in microelectronics design and production. 7 It should be noted that these movements were mainly gathered around the FNDC (Forum for the Democratization of Communication) (http://www.fndc.org.br).
